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1 Introduction
Methods of political economy and power analysis
are increasingly used by development
organisations which recognise the importance of
understanding context, actors and relationships.
Gaining a practical grasp of power and political
economy in the contexts where they work, it is
hoped, will help them to better plan, strategise,
identify entry points, map actors, foresee pitfalls
and opportunities, and ultimately lead to
improved policy outcomes. This interest in power
and political economy has generated demand for
useful concepts, methods and tools of analysis.
Donor approaches can be said to fall into two very
broad categories: ‘power analysis’ and ‘political
economy analysis’, which offer distinctive but also
complementary ways of understanding how power
operates. Understandably, there is confusion as to
what is meant by ‘power’ and ‘political economy’
– whether they are the same thing, whether they
complement or contradict one another, and which
is best suited for particular issues or contexts.
This article seeks to clarify these two broad
approaches and to identify their similarities and
differences. We maintain that while they are
ontologically distinct (i.e. based on different
meaning systems), they can be used in
complementary ways. However, their different
starting points make it important to surface their
assumptions about how change happens, rather
than simply ‘mixing methods’. We identify what
each approach can and can’t offer, and argue that
when used together they can question taken-for-
granted development narratives. We also suggest
that it is useful to ask who should do power or
political economy analysis, when and why.
2 Power and political economy analysis
compared
Interest in power and political economy analysis
has grown as development donors and civil
society actors recognise the effects power
relations can have on their policies and
programmes, and the benefits of solid context
analysis. While often referred to in the same
breath, power and political economy approaches
have different ontological, epistemological and
disciplinary groundings. As ‘power’ has been
famously described as an ‘essentially contested’
concept (Lukes 2005), it is no surprise that these
approaches view power from different positions.
Simply put, political economy analysis explains
the behaviour of political actions through the
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lenses of economic institutionalism – applying
economic assumptions about human behaviour
and rational choice to political and institutional
behaviour and relationships. The main focus is
on identifying key actors, their assumed or
observed interests, and what helps or hinders
their cooperation. Structures, norms and ‘rules
of the game’ that shape their behaviour are also
considered. In contrast, power analysis is
informed by critical theory, anthropology,
political sociology and feminist theory. It gives
greater attention to the influence of socialised
and internalised norms on behaviour, and to the
interplay between agency and structure. Both
approaches, in different ways, seek to unpack the
more and less visible dimensions of power and
relationships that facilitate or block change.
The image of an iceberg is a useful analogy for
what these two traditions offer, and where they
overlap and complement one another (Figure 1).
Political economy tends to focus on actors,
structures and processes that are visible and
‘above the waterline’, as well as what may lie
half-hidden under the surface such as informal
norms, institutions and relationships. Power
analysis is concerned with less visible social
norms, beliefs and structures well ‘below the
water line’, as well as half-hidden patterns near
the surface that shape actors’ behaviour and
relationships. By combining these perspectives,
we can gain a more complete and systemic view
of how power operates across the spectrum of
these different levels. This, we argue, can provide
a more robust analysis that surfaces
assumptions, exposing blind spots and
unquestioned narratives. But to do this, we need
to understand these different lenses, and what
they do and don’t perceive.
3 What is political economy analysis?
Political economy analysis (PEA) is broadly
defined as a ‘methodology of economics applied
to the analysis of political behaviour and
institutions’ (Weingast and Wittman 2006). This
broad definition includes both a set of concepts
and frameworks that looks at the intersection
between economics and politics as a unique field
of study (Barnett, Hinich and Schofield 1993),
but also as a methodology that uses economic
institutionalism as well as historical and
institutional analysis to understand political
dynamics (Alt and Shepsle 1990; North 1990).
The contemporary use of PEA can be traced back
to the 1950s when political scientists
systematically used instruments of economic
analysis to better understand political cooperation
dilemmas, the competition for electoral votes,
the distribution of scarce resources, the
advancement of political careers, and the
formation of coalitions, to cite a few examples
(Arrow 1951; Downs 1957; Riker 1962; Mayhew
1974; Ostrom 1990). After the 1990s, the next
generation of PEA significantly revolutionised the
understanding of political dynamics, especially to
understand legislative politics, budget politics,
electoral dynamics, the bureaucracy, the judiciary,
fiscal and monetary policies, international
relations, ethnic conflict, decentralisation,
democratisation, and so forth (Barnett et al. 1993;
Weingast and Wittman 2006).
PEA permeated the thinking and practice of many
bilateral and multilateral development agencies
as early as the 1990s (Burki and Perry 1998).
Several agencies including the Department for
International Development (DFID), GIZ, USAID
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Figure 1 Power and political economy analysis: looking
above and below the waterline
Illustration by Shabnam Akram.
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and parts of the UN followed suit in subsequent
years with different tools and instruments to
understand ‘Poverty and Social Impact Analysis’,
‘Problem-Driven Governance and Political
Economy Analysis’, ‘drivers of change’ or
‘political settlements’ (Booth et al. 2005; Dahl-
Ostergaard et al. 2005; Booth et al. 2006; Di John
and Putzel 2009; Leftwick 2010; Khan 2012;
Routley and Hulme 2013). Although the detail
and methodology has varied, the primary focus of
PEA is on actors, networks, institutions and their
competing interests. PEA can incorporate
varying levels of analysis – macro (country
context), meso (policy implementation) and
micro (policy impact) (Haider and Rao 2010: 4);
and be done with different audiences in mind,
including rigorous academic assessments,
country practice guides and rapid assessments
(Reich and Balarajan 2012).
3.1 Common features of political economy analysis
A complete survey of the common elements and
methodologies that define PEA is not possible
here. However, some of the underlying features
include:
Institutions matter. There is an explicit
recognition that norms and structures matter to
shape individual behaviour and indirectly
development (policy) outcomes (North 1990).
Institutions are taken as given ‘rules of the
game’ that set out the context, motivations and
sanctions in which strategic individuals make
choices. While early versions of PEA focused on
given formal governance and economic
structures, contemporary approaches consider:
a how both formal and informal institutions are
embedded in social and historical contexts that
shape behaviour (Levitsky and Helmke 2004);
b how institutions tend to reproduce power
asymmetries, as they reflect the preferences
and interests of influential actors (Moe 2005);
c institutional strength and resilience (Levitsky
and Murillo 2009).
Individuals matter. For the most part, PEA tends
to focus on individuals or agents as the main unit
of analysis (i.e. mayors, presidents, bureaucrats,
citizens). An underlying premise is that political
behaviour tends to reflect for the most part, the best
interests of such individuals, given their legal,
economic and social constraints; however, there
are some important revisions to keep in mind:
a The best interest of individuals does not only
include material benefits or rewards. The
search for the common good or even altruistic
behaviour can be modelled as furthering the
best interest of an individual;
b The notion of best interest will change with
context and over time; for example,
individuals tend to have different attitudes
towards taking risks when they are relatively
wealthier than when they are poorer
(Bernstein 1996);
c Actors are not always individuals but
sometimes they represent a collection of like-
minded individuals with similar interests
(i.e. a political party or an association of
municipalities, or institutional interests such
as the military).
Commitment matters. Political economy analyses
pay special attention to understanding the
motivations of individuals to cooperate (or not)
over time. A critical part of reinforcing
commitment is the role of ‘third party enforcers’,
to help cement agreements, legitimise decisions,
and uphold (enforce) agreements (Scartascini et
al. 2008).
a These commitment devices can take the form
of actors, rules or ‘currencies’ (i.e. money,
prestige, material goods);
b These enforcers could be reflected in a formal
institution (e.g. the judiciary or a Supreme
Court) or an ‘informal’ institution (e.g. a
council of tribal chiefs).
3.2 Advantages and limitations of political economy
analysis
The main advantage of using PEA in a
development setting is that it seeks to
understand the behaviour of key actors not in a
moral, normative or ideal fashion but rather in
terms of strategic responses to existing norms and
structures. For example, the act of paying a bribe
in exchange for a service may be a survival
response in a culture of corruption and deficient
government services. Another advantage is the
explicit recognition of the intersecting space
between the formal rules of the game and the informal
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practices of actors on the ground. Furthermore,
PEA could be used to understand the political
institutions and dynamics operating at different
stages of the policy process (formulation,
approval, implementation, monitoring) to
identify entry points for donor intervention. For
example, citizen participation efforts are usually
geared towards helping policy formulation or
monitoring execution, but rarely for overseeing
the process of legislative adoption.
There are some limitations of PEA that need to be
taken into account. First, a political economy
analysis will be of limited use unless there is an
articulation of a specific theory of change
associated with the expected development
initiative. In other words, it would be difficult to
identify the main actors, institutions and drivers
of change unless there is an explicit discussion of
how change takes place and why and when this is
more likely to happen. It is useful to ask, for
example, ‘Why should politicians care about
child malnutrition?’ ‘Who are local politicians
accountable to?’ ‘Why – and when – do people
mobilise to demand regime change?’ Note that
PEA does not tend to ask how institutions or
norms change – rather who will support or
oppose these reforms and who the ‘drivers’ are
likely to be.
A second limitation is that PEAs require a
significant degree of background work and adaptation
to the specific context if the analysis is to produce
useful insights into the relevant actors, norms
and dynamics. Usually sector-specific PEAs can
yield important information about the politics
behind a concrete development initiative, but this
would in turn need to be informed by a national
level analysis of political dynamics. For example,
a PEA of water management can look at the
relevant actors and networks around the local
provision of safe and clean water, but it will need
to be complemented or informed by the dynamics
and motivations to deliver public services of the
main political parties at the national level.
In addition to the significant time of analysis and
level of expertise, a comprehensive PEA needs
constant updating to reflect changing factors in the
development context. The specific validity and
practical relevance of a PEA depends on how the
analysis is able to incorporate changes due to
external shocks (i.e. natural disasters and
emergency situations), domestic factors (i.e. after
elections) or international factors (i.e. changes in
donors’ spending priorities). While a PEA will not
be able to anticipate these factors or their
consequences, it should provide the analytical
elements so that development practitioners can
adjust the main findings of PEA according to new
developments. For example, the validity of a PEA
explaining the politics of effective and
transparent service delivery in municipal
governments may change after holding local
elections; in this case, the motivations and priorities of
some elected mayors may change, but the imperative
for improved service delivery, the institutions of
municipal decentralisation and the available
fiscal resources will remain the same.
4 What is power analysis?
Power analysis (PA) is a general term used to
describe the approaches used by development and
social change actors to better understand the ways
in which different dimensions of power act to
reinforce or reduce poverty and marginalisation
and to identify actors, entry points and positive
forms of power that can be mobilised in favour of
desired changes. Power analysis has
multidisciplinary roots, drawing broadly on the
fields of social theory, politics, political sociology,
anthropology and feminist theory. It complements
the strong actor- and organisation-orientation of
PEA by giving greater attention to the role of
socialised and structural dimensions of power,
how these may enable and constrain actors, and
how they change. PA is a method of context
analysis that articulates a theory of change and
identifies strategies that may be effective; it has
mostly been used to develop a country strategy or
design a programme or sector strategy, but has
also been used in mid-term reviews, evaluations
and learning processes.1
4.1 Common features of power analysis
Power analysis draws on a range of concepts and
frameworks that explore both the formal and
observable, and the informal and less visible
dimensions of power. A commonly used framework
is the notion that power may take ‘visible’,
‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ forms (VeneKlasen and
Miller 2002; Gaventa 2006), building on the
concept of ‘three dimensional power’ (Lukes
2005). This framework distinguishes between the
formal and observable exercise of power (visible),
power or bias that is exercised from behind the
scenes (hidden), and hegemonic norms and beliefs
that secure consent to domination (invisible).
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Power is often understood simplistically as ‘power
over’ – forms of authority, control or domination.
This may take the form of brute domination, but
it can also operate by constraining what others
think they can do or even imagine is possible.
‘Power over’, like ‘invisible power’, extends
beyond physical or verbal forms of domination to
affecting the ways in which people view
themselves and their rights and capabilities.
For example, Gramsci’s hegemony describes how
people are persuaded to do things that are
against their own best interests (Gramsci 1971).
They come to accept the claims of elites that the
pursuit of their own interests coincides with a
general interest. Ideals and norms are
‘hegemonic’ if they hold people in their sway,
remain unquestioned and come to be viewed as
‘common sense’. Gender analysis offers a similar
framing of power: the idea that women cannot do
certain jobs because of physical inadequacies or
that women make better parents than men has
been hegemonic at certain points in history, and
in certain contexts. PA draws on frameworks of
empowerment to identify the positive
‘expressions of power’ that may be needed to
counter hegemony, such as the idea that less
powerful people can develop ‘power to, power
with and power within’ (Rowlands 1997;
VeneKlasen and Miller 2002):
z ‘Power to’ is agency or the ability to act and can
begin with the awareness that it is possible to
act; it can grow in the process of taking action
and realising that one can effect change, as well
as through developing skills and capacities.
z ‘Power with’ describes collective action, and
includes both the psychological and physical
power that comes from being united and
acting together to resist domination.
z ‘Power within’ describes the sense of confidence,
dignity and self-esteem that comes from
gaining awareness of one’s situation and
realising the possibility to do something about it.
These ‘expressions of power’ or agency are
reminders that power can be used positively as
well as negatively, by the disempowered as well
as the powerful. The concepts are often used
together: people need ‘power within’ in order to
act, and ‘power to’ to act collectively; the ‘power
with’ of shared understanding and action can
also strengthen self-esteem and agency
(Veneklasen and Miller 2002).
4.2 Advantages and limitations of power analysis
Advantages. Learning about power, and analysing
context and interventions with a power lens can
help development actors develop sensitivities and
competencies that enable them to act in ways
that will shift these relations and to empower
marginalised people. Like PEA, power analysis is
used to deepen contextual and structural
understandings of the national and regional
situations in which an organisation works, as well
as the global actors and forces that influence this
local context. Its value added is to identify
enablers and constraints related to people’s
aspirations and cultural norms that may affect
an intervention – for example, creating
participatory spaces may not work if people
cannot imagine having control over their lives.
Programme staff and partners can use power
analysis to anticipate responses and prevent
their programmes from being blocked or
co-opted by powerful interests, and to identify
entry points they may not have considered.
Power analysis can also identify possible perverse
consequences, as when poverty reduction or post-
conflict reconstruction programmes empower
wealthy people or warlord factions, rather than
people living in poverty. Power analysis can be a
means of building the knowledge and
competencies needed by staff and partners to
work effectively within complex, unequal and
fast-changing environments. Power analysis can
also help those working in development to reflect
on their own positions as political actors, both
personally and institutionally, and to become
more aware of how to handle the power dynamics
of their relationships. This dimension is often
missing from context analysis.
Limitations. Power analysis does require a certain
level of understanding of and ability to apply key
concepts of structure and agency, which typically
reach beyond the quick identification of actors,
their interests and networks. It can require some
time and practice to use, and if staff or
consultants are not familiar with them, they may
be used in more superficial and limited ways.
The emphasis on sociological and ideological
context and structure can also divert attention
away from the practical analysis of actors, their
interests and relationships – ‘losing sight of the
wood for the trees’. For this reason we find it
practical to emphasise the complementarity
between different approaches.
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5 Political economy and power analysis combined
Power and political economy analysis both seek
to explain how some individuals or groups
behave towards and seek to control others, how
consent to such control is secured and
maintained, and what enables or prevents actors
from cooperating with one another. An agency
perspective sees power as something that people
and institutions can hold, wield, lose and gain,
usually through political or military alliances or
contestations. It is concerned with the interests
and motivations of actors, and drives their ways
of relating to one another. A structure perspective
sees power as the social and cultural norms and
beliefs that are unconsciously internalised and
that shape, often invisibly, people’s thoughts and
actions. Power is embedded in all relationships,
institutions and systems of knowledge, and is
part of the way our societies and cultures work.
These understandings of power often form the
basis of a theory of society, which looks not only
at actors and relationships but at how social
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Table 1 A Three-way comparison of political economy and power analysis
Political economy Å Æ Power analysis
Main dimensions of power Visible Hidden Invisible
The role of institutions/ For the most part, Emphasis on informal Focus on ‘structuration’ –
rules of the game institutions are taken as institutions, often resilient interplay between conscious 
given or they are hard to to change agency and internalisation of
change in the short run norms
Examples of institutions Formal government and Informal institutions Social institutions (gender
NG institutions (mayors, (traditional governance norms, ethnic identity, etc.) 
cabinets, NGOs); existing structures, militias) and networks (kinship, 
norms and regulations political solidarity)
The role of individuals Individual, rational action. Combine individual and Focus on individual and 
Organisational action collective actions through collective consciousness 
networks (shaped by different factors)
Cooperation and Collective action is the Collective action results Collective action results 
contestation result of individual from individual motivations from social and cultural 
motivations and social norms norms
Sanctions and enforcement Formal (legal) ways to Informal sanctions outside Fear of exclusion or loss of
legitimise agreements formal legal norms, such identity; internalised social 
(contracts) or sanction as bribery or coercion norms
defections
How they explain change Types of actors,  Greater trust in agency to Changes in critical awareness 
over time (key drivers of preferences and strategies change power relations. and sense of empowerment 
change) change but institutional (‘Change from below’?) leading to growth in agency
change is much slower (‘Change from within’?)
(‘Change from above’?)
Example: how to ensure What are the legal, Who performs local Who is neglected from 
effective service delivery political, and financial government functions in local governments or does
from local governments? resources allocated to practice? Power operates not benefit from delivery of
local governments? ‘behind the scenes’ services, and why?
Sample recommendations Influence policymaking Strengthen and empower Raise consciousness to 
emerging from analysis through political advocacy organisations, build transform the way people 
and seeking access to collective leadership, raise perceive themselves and 
formal decision-making the visibility of issues, those around them
mobilise new voices 
Note NG = national government.
Source Authors’ own. 
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norms and structures are created, reproduced
and transformed.
A useful entry point for combining the analysis of
power, particularly in political decision-making
and democratic participation, is to look at three
‘dimensions’ or ‘faces’ of power (Lukes 2005;
Gaventa 2006; VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). As
noted above, the typology moves from the visible
power of formal decision-making processes, to the
hidden power of organised biases and agenda-
setting behind the scenes, to the invisible power of
forces that shape people’s consciousness and felt
needs.
In practice, the three types of power will overlap.
However, it is important to combine the visible
and hidden or informal dimensions of power with
the underlying cultural and social norms and
practices in order to identify how development
changes take place. Table 1 offers a systematic
guide to compare how the political economy and
power analysis frameworks can better
understand the different dimensions of power.
5.1 The common features of political economy and
power analysis
It is useful to disaggregate the key elements of
political economy and power analysis, in order to
see what each perspective contributes to
understanding them. Here we consider four key
elements that shape power relations, but there
are certainly others:
z Formal and visible structures, institutions and
rules of the game;
z Informal and invisible structures, norms,
beliefs and narratives;
z Actors, their interests and strategies;
z Processes of cooperation and contestation.
For each element of analysis we describe what
aspects are considered by political economy or
power analysis, and suggest some guiding
questions to further explore these complex
manifestations of power in an applied setting.
Structures, institutions and rules of the game 
Formal power can be thought of as the visible,
recognised structures of power that are part of
the way in which societies work: institutions that
mediate the relationship between those with
legitimate authority and those who are subject to
that authority, the laws and rules that define
what is acceptable and what is not acceptable,
and how those who break laws and flout norms
are treated. There are several decades of work
around institutional analysis looking at (a) ‘how
institutions work’; (b) the expected behavioural
effects and resulting outcomes; and (c) sources of
endogenous change (who shapes those
institutions in the first place?). Over the past two
decades, there has been renewed attention at the
less visible or legally recognised ways through
which norms, rules and behaviour are regulated,
sometimes through informal, illegal or
clandestine forms of coercion. Taken together,
this set of institutions form part of ‘the rules of
the game’, or the set of clearly defined norms
and rules that are accepted, communicated and
enforced through formal and informal channels.
The notion of ‘the rules of the game’ closely
defines the arenas or spaces in which power and
political dynamics take place. Conversely, it
could be said that power relations in different
arenas are shaped by different rules of the game.
A powercube framework has been developed to
analyse the ownership and inclusiveness of
different spaces of public deliberation and
decision-making (Gaventa 2006).2 According to
the framework, decision-making can take place
in closed, invited or claimed spaces. Spaces are
closed when they limit the opportunities for
inclusion outside established procedures (e.g.
council member meetings include members previously
elected for that role but not others). Spaces are invited
when citizens can permeate decision-making
bodies to voice their concerns (e.g. public
consultations); such spaces are usually established
by authorities for citizen participation. Finally,
spaces are created or claimed when actors create
alternative arenas for engagement and action
(e.g. alliances, street protests). By looking at
different arenas and the rules that shape them,
the analysis can identify ‘political opportunity
structures’ or entry points to effectively influence
decision-making.
Importantly, the notion of spaces looks beyond
actors and their assumed interests and relative
power, and considers the ways in which power
may operate in these points of interaction. The
power relations between actors will be shaped by
the rules and norms (visible, hidden and
invisible) that determine access to spaces,
accepted ways of behaving and speaking within
them, and how agenda-setting and decision-
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making are governed. Spaces underscore the
extent to which power is fluid, temporal and
contextual rather than fixed.
Key questions are:
z What are the formal existing institutions
(legal frameworks, norms, regulations)
defining the rules of the game?
– Are these rules stable over time or
predictable?
– Are they legitimised or widely accepted?
– Are they effectively applied? If not, why?
z What are the existing practices that define
how the game is actually played?
– Do these rules seek to expand, complement,
or contradict the existing formal rules of the
game?
– Are these rules stable over time or
predictable?
– Are they legitimised or widely accepted?
– Are they effectively applied? If not, why?
z Who participated in drafting the rules of the
game? At what point in time were these rules
decided?
– Do the rules represent the views, values or
interests of a particular group?
Invisible norms, discourses and narratives 
Informal power can be thought of as the socialised
norms, discourses and cultural practices that are
part of our everyday lives. Informal power
relations are internalised through socialisation
from a young age, starting with acceptance of
inequality in roles, for instance, between father
and mother and older and younger family
members, or boys and girls. These informal power
relations are often taken for granted as given, or
natural. Because deliberate strategies of coercion
or domination are not required, informal power is
sometimes also referred to as ‘invisible’ power
(VeneKlasen and Miller 2002; Gaventa 2006) or
the ‘third dimension’ of power (Lukes 2005). The
distinction between formal and informal power is
useful in drawing attention to the fact that
changes in formal and visible structures or
strategies of domination are necessary, but not
sufficient to transform societies and make them
more equitable. Laws may precede and indeed
hasten social change, but to be effective they need
to be accompanied by efforts to change socialised
norms, attitudes and values.
Much social theory focuses on these less visible
and culturally embedded forms of power to
explain how social norms, hierarchies and
patterns of behaviour are automatically
reproduced and resistant to change. Some focus
on the deliberate strategies and actions of powerful
actors to manipulate the consciousness and felt
needs of less powerful actors (e.g. Lukes 2005).
Others explain this not as a result of intentional
‘agency’ or even of deterministic ‘structures’, but
as a kind of continuous and unconscious interplay
between agency and structure – where power is
understood as the norms, discourses and
behaviour that are socialised and internalised by
all actors (e.g. Bourdieu 1980; Foucault 1991;
Hayward 2000).
Key questions are:
z What are the predominant identities?
– How are these identities shaped and
reproduced by social and cultural norms?
– How do they influence political and judicial
structures and processes?
– How do people’s self-perceptions of their
identities either reinforce or challenge
prevailing social and cultural norms?
– How do these identities shape different
values or discourses?
z How are different narratives built into
common development discourses?
– Do these discourses contribute to
reinforcing social hierarchies or exclusion?
– How do these narratives build on beliefs,
norms and cultural practices to legitimise and
reinforce material power structures?
– Are these narratives used to advance
reforms or legitimise the status quo?
Actors, interests and strategies
Both political economy and power analysis
recognise the role of agency in producing policy
changes, and the fact that these actors are bound
or limited by existing formal or informal power
relations. The focus on actors seeks to identify
whether the relevant players have the capacity to
produce meaningful development changes.
Strictly speaking, however, it is important to
distinguish who are the critical or veto players
without whom policy changes could not take
place, and the other players who are important
but not decisive for producing changes. A second
important distinction is that the relevant veto
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players are not always visible or fully mobilised
that are nevertheless present in the development
process. Finally, critical actors tend to be
identified with individuals or organisations
(presidents, mayors, municipalities, NGOs).
However in practice, it is relevant to
disaggregate who the critical actors are, and whether
it is safe to assume that a collective body (e.g.
municipality) is represented by a single actor
(e.g. the mayor) or whether there is greater
complexity within (e.g. a diverse group of
municipal council members).
Once the key development actors have been
identified, the next step is to establish what are
their powers, roles and responsibilities. Again,
their role may already be defined by the formal
and legal institutions or structures (e.g. a
mayor), or by traditional norms (a council chief).
Yet this description should be different from
analysing the actual motivations and interests to
fulfil their expected roles, independent of their
formal obligations (e.g. a mayor may be directly
accountable to his/her party leaders, rather than
the will of the voters).
In sum, some of the relevant questions to keep in
mind when analysing actors and interests are:
z Who are the main actors involved?
– Who is decisive to produce development
changes?
– Who is present but not decisive?
– Who is decisive but not present or (not yet)
mobilised?
z What are the prerogatives, attributions,
responsibilities of these actors?
– Who established these roles?
z What are the motivations of these actors to
fulfil their responsibilities?
– What are their preferences, interests,
strategies?
– What do they really do in practice?
Cooperation and contestation 
The question of what makes actors cooperate
with one another or not, is probably one of the
most decisive pieces of the analysis to
understand what kind of development changes
can take place. Yet an answer to this question
cannot be fully articulated until there is clarity
on the formal and informal rules, and the
interests and motivations of actors. Over time,
political science has invested heavily in
understanding the logic of collective action. Simply
put, joint or cooperative action is likely to take
place when: (a) there are fewer individuals (who
can keep track of one another’s actions);
(b) individuals have converging interests along
the same dimension or issue; (c) individuals tend
to share longer time horizons; and (d) there are
credible enforcement mechanisms to ensure
cooperation. By contrast, it follows that larger
groups of individuals with diverse interests or
backgrounds, who have short-term interests and
mistrust one another are unlikely to produce
cooperation.
Needless to say, not all forms of cooperation are
formalised, long-term or ideological. It is often
the case that temporary alliances (or alignments
of interests) take place around specific
agreements at one given point in time. It is also the
case that different clusters of actors can form
rotating or changing coalitions. These are all valid
forms of cooperation, they are unlikely to lead to
sustained or even continuous development
changes over time.
Some of the relevant questions to keep in mind
when analysing actors and interests are:
z What are the actors’ motivations to cooperate
with one another?
– Is it duty, tradition, self-interest?
– Is it short-term or long-term interest?
z What makes cooperation possible?
– Is it formal agreements, informal pacts or
material exchanges?
– Do existing institutions facilitate
cooperation?
z How do actors ensure cooperation?
– What happens if/when actors abandon their
agreements?
– Are there any explicit rules, formal
agreements or informal pacts to ensure
cooperation?
6 Application: developing a shared theory of
change
One of the most common questions that comes
up when applying political economy, power
analysis, or a mix of the two, is how can these
make a difference in practice? There is no
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shortage of analyses that had no impact
whatsoever on design and implementation, let
alone monitoring and evaluation, although more
research is needed to document this empirically
(Routley and Hulme 2013). There are also strong
institutional inertias within donor agencies that
make it difficult to accept and act upon PEA
recommendations to implement effective
reforms on the field (ibid.). From a country office
perspective, the challenge is to avoid the cost of
hiring regular consultants to update or develop
sector-specific PEAs for every new intervention.
One concrete way forward is for country offices
to develop a common understanding of a
programme’s theory of change, given the
existing stakeholders, motivations, institutions
and limitations highlighted by the country’s PEA.
The idea is to develop a political baseline that
explains how power and power relations operate
in a given policy sector, who are the main allies
and opponents to a proposed policy change, what
are the potential coalitions for change, and most
important of all, to develop a clear idea of what
effective and practical policy change would look
like. Based on this shared understanding of
power dynamics, the country office’s staff should
be able to develop accurate objectives, strategies,
entry points, activities, outcomes and indicators
that respond to the analysis.
We suggest that in many cases a combined
political economy and power analysis will lead to
a more robust, multi-perspective theory of
change. By looking at power from different angles
and assumptions, making these viewpoints
explicit and comparing them, the analysis will be
more likely to identify decisive actors, rules and
underlying social dynamics. It should then be
possible to articulate an explicit understanding of
(a) the goals or objectives of a specific
development initiative, and (b) the causal and
contextual factors that are most conducive to
achieving that goal. Recent studies and
systematic reviews around transparency and
accountability initiatives have found that there is
little or no in-depth analysis of what ‘meaningful
change’ looks like in this development field
(Gaventa and McGee 2013). A related concern is
the lack of a ‘theory based’ approach to project
development and evaluation that explains ‘the
implicit assumptions, logic and mechanisms
behind complex development interventions […]
contribut[ing] to a better understanding of the
causal/impact chains’ (Gaventa and McGee 2013;
White 2010). This section addresses both issues.
6.1 Identifying the notion of ‘success’
The use of political economy and power analysis
is likely to yield accurate policy recommendations
if there is a clear and practical definition of the
expected outcome of a development initiative. If
we take for example current initiatives around
accountability and transparency, it becomes clear
that a simple definition of ‘success’ is obscured by
the confusion of whether transparency and
accountability are ‘means to an end’ or ‘ends’ in
themselves (Mejía Acosta 2013; Gaventa and
McGee 2013). In the first case, existing
development interventions could be more explicit
about what the expected impact of ‘accountability’
is supposed to achieve, namely improved service
delivery or increased citizen participation. But if
‘improved citizen participation’ appears as an
expected outcome, it would be useful to theorise
and explain key questions such as ‘which citizens
it refers to’, whether they were ‘active prior to the
creation of the mechanism’, ‘where they get their
information’, ‘how they act upon it’, ‘on which
issues they mobilise’, and ‘whether they are well-
behaved or antagonistic toward state institutions’,
to cite a few (McGee and Gaventa 2011). An in-
depth understanding of what constitutes a
‘successful’ development initiative is a key step
for identifying the sequence of factors leading to
that goal.
Sometimes, development initiatives are correct
in pursuing a higher-end and explicit long-term
development goal, but failed to make explicit the
immediate short-term changes needed to achieve
longer-term impact. Even in these cases, an explicit
discussion of the proximate or intermediate
objectives would be useful to identify an
operational notion of ‘meaningful change’, as well
as the sequence of necessary steps leading to it.
6.2 How does change happen?
A key feature of political economy and power
analysis, combined, is that it offers a systematic
way for understanding the key stakeholders,
norms, discourses and power dynamics
contributing to (or continuously blocking) the
attainment of meaningful change. Assuming
there is a clearly defined notion of meaningful
change such as the improvement in the delivery
of public services, the specialised literature tends
to assume a causal connection that begins with
Pettit and Mejía Acosta Power Above and Below the Waterline: Bridging Political Economy and Power Analysis18
1 Joshi_Schultze-Kraft IDSB45.5.qxd  11/08/2014  16:50  Page 18
citizens’ awareness (i.e. to improved
information), towards articulating citizens’ voice
(i.e. through formal and informal institutions),
and increasing the responsiveness of service
providers (i.e. establishing clear sanctions when
public servants fail to do their job) (Joshi 2013).
While the causal link between accountability and
improved service delivery may be intuitive to
development practitioners, ‘this chain of
causation is seldom explicitly examined’ in
existing development initiatives aimed at
increasing transparency and amplifying voice
(McGee and Gaventa 2011).
A first step towards identifying how change
happens would entail an identification of the key
decisive actors or veto players (whose consent is
needed to adopt new policy changes), the
commonly shared interests and motivations, and
the existing institutions, norms and arenas that
facilitate these changes (Tsebelis 2001). In this
context, identifying the relevant ‘drivers of
change’ and the corresponding coalitions for
change constitute key steps to understanding
how meaningful changes can take place.
But identifying an expected – even if preliminary
– theory of change, could also be useful to
understand why change does not happen or why
changes are systematically blocked and by whom.
Rarely in development, and in public policy in
general, do policy changes take place in a linear,
incremental way. More often, political economy
and power analysis can be used to explain why
development changes have not taken place or
why the motivations of actors do not change over
time. Depending on the case, key actors would
have incentives to block reforms if these go
against their vested interests. In practical terms,
a systematic stakeholder mapping of drivers and
blockers, enablers and spoilers, would allow the
identification of ‘bottlenecks’ in the reform
process, that is, critical situations or arenas
where there is no visible agreement and a policy
stalemate ensues; another example is the
presence of ‘glass ceilings’ or stages in the
reform process beyond which any meaningful
change is no longer possible due to the presence
of vested interests. Equally, the analysis may
show how accepted social norms and behaviours
perpetuate the problems despite successes in the
policy sphere – pointing to the need for other
kinds of initiatives, such as working with the
media, culture or social movements.
In sum, we argue that existing development
initiatives for the most part are not underpinned
by a clear articulation of exactly what outcome
or impact is sought, or of how the actions and
inputs contemplated are expected to generate
that outcome or impact (McGee and Gaventa
2011). A combined political economy and power
analysis can help to surface and sharpen this
vision. The following guiding questions seek to
address that gap and help practitioners to
identify key elements in the process of change.
Key questions are:
z When and how is change likely to happen (or not)?
– Who are the critical actors needed to produce
meaningful changes?
– Are there any actors not present or that
could be mobilised more effectively?
– What are the possible coalitions of change?
What holds these coalitions together?
– What are the arenas, norms and structures
enabling (or blocking change)?
– What are the ‘bottlenecks’ to reform? What
are the glass ceilings?
6.3 Entry points for cooperation
If properly done, a combined political economy
and power analysis framework, or a menu of
approaches drawing from both traditions, would
help development practitioners to identify the
national level and sector-specific context in
which proposed interventions are likely to work.
The analysis should also help identify the
decisive actors for producing meaningful change
as well as those blocking it, to articulate more
clearly what the possible coalitions for reform
are. It would also identify the informal and
invisible power dynamics that block change, or
that could be mobilised to enable change. But
perhaps most important of all, the combined
framework or menu would offer an analytical
map of the sector or domain to inform the
discussion (amongst development actors) of
where lie the key entry points for a successful
cooperation and where the perceived risks are.
A useful consideration in this regard, for
example, is to distinguish whether the same
actors play different roles and have different
entry points in the policy process to facilitate or
block meaningful change. Taking for example the
role of municipal mayors in participatory
budgeting, it is often assumed that local
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authorities can greatly benefit from enhancing
citizens’ participation in budget formulation.
However, a broader discussion of relevant actors
and dynamics throughout the budget process will
show that mayors lack the technical competencies
to demand scarce government funds from the
central government, including the Executive and
the Ministry of Finance. In this example, any
cooperation funding to support participatory
budgeting will be incomplete unless the
motivations, capabilities and political alignments
of mayors vis-à-vis the central government are
taken into account.
Some guiding questions from the combined
framework include:
z What would a ‘successful’ donor or
organisational strategy or programme look like?
– Who are the key actors that can maximise
initiatives? Which actors could potentially
block the desired change?
– Who are the key actors that have not yet
been identified, mobilised or could be better
supported?
– What are the assumed spaces of interaction,
and could more be done to create new spaces,
formal or informal, or to change the culture of
existing spaces?
z Where and when are the opportunities for
change and reform?
– At which point in the policy process can
meaningful change take place? What are the
entry points and sequences of intervention
that may be needed?
– What complementary strategies may be
required, beyond the conventional ones (e.g.
to address visible, hidden and invisible
power)?
– Are staff and partners well prepared to
support meaningful change (financially,
technically, politically)?
7 Ways forward for a combined approach
The combined or complementary approach to
political economy and power analysis is an effort
to combine different analytical and
methodological traditions to better understand
political and power dynamics facilitating or
blocking development interventions. The very act
of combining and comparing different
standpoints on power and political economy can
lead to a more robust and explicit analysis.
There are several ways in which this work can be
and will be strengthened in the near future.
Conceptually, we need to further refine and
combine the different frameworks to identify the
ways in which alternative, context-relevant
development narratives can be created and
embedded around particular interventions to
boost or hinder prevailing development
discourses. Importantly, there is a need to
recognise the inherent tensions as well as
complementarities: political economy and power
analysis are rooted in different disciplines, with
distinct ontological and epistemological
underpinnings that are not always compatible.
Applied alone, each tradition is likely to neglect
certain dimensions of power; and combined too
simplistically, there are risks that important
concepts will be only partially understood or
weakly applied within the framing of a single set
of assumptions. Inter-disciplinary work is
essential in this regard.
Empirically, we need to further develop survey,
interview, observation and other instruments to
adequately capture, in quantitative and
qualitative terms, the different actors, interests,
norms, institutions and change coalitions. We
will continue to develop practical tools and
frameworks for applying these concepts in
complementary ways within cooperation
processes (many do exist and are being tested
with SDC, Sida and other organisations). An
important lesson emerging from such efforts is
that the concepts, lenses and tools of political
economy and power analysis can best be integrated
in a selective way into existing processes and
instruments, rather than burdening overworked
staff with yet another requirement. The analysis
can be applied in light and insightful ways at all
stages of a cooperation cycle, rather than as a
single ex ante exercise; more work, for example, is
needed to integrate political economy and power
analysis into evaluation and outcome
measurement (McGee and Pettit 2013).
Practically, there is a need to work collaboratively
to develop training and capacity development
resources and sessions to teach and validate
these approaches working closely with diverse
organisations and at different levels. For
example, more efforts could be made to
integrate power analysis frameworks and tools
into political economy training and guidelines,
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and vice versa. There is also a need to develop
more participatory and multi-stakeholder
approaches which can allow partner
organisations to develop shared analyses,
theories of change, strategies, and evaluation
frameworks which consider the multiple,
context-specific dimensions of power. Further
involvement could include programme-specific
accompaniment, action learning, assessments
and practical capacity development workshops
with organisations and their partners. Applied,
experiential learning approaches can be a vital
complement to more formal training.
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Notes
* This article builds on IDS collaboration with
the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (Sida) to develop
guidelines for power analysis (Pettit 2013) and
with the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC) to strengthen power and
political economy analysis within the
programmes of its Decentralisation and Local
Governance Network (DLGN) (Mejía Acosta
and Pettit 2013). This article is adapted with
permission from these two publications, and
support from colleagues at SDC and Sida is
gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to
Shandana Mohmand, Alex Shankland and
participants in political economy and power
analysis workshops held in Brighton, Bern,
Sarajevo, Stockholm, Prishtina and Skopje
from 2012–14. Surbhi Mahajan and Katy
Oswald provided valuable research assistance.
1 IDS has been documenting and innovating
with various methods of power analysis over
the past decade through its work with Sida
(e.g. Pettit 2013), SDC (this article), DFID
and a number of international NGOs and civil
society organisations worldwide. In the UK
this work has been developed into practical
methodological guidelines for use by grass-
roots organisations (Hunjan and Pettit 2011;
Pettit 2013).  
2 See also www.powercube.net. 
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